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1. Introduction 
 
In early April 2009, President Obama asked congress for $ 83 billion of additional 
funding for Iraq and Afghanistan with a view to eradicate decisively the Al Qaeda threat. This 
included $ 1.6 billion and $ 1.4 billion for Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, for “diplomatic 
programs and development aid”. An additional $ 800 million was asked for the Palestinian 
Authority, including some humanitarian aid for Gaza. An additional $ 1 billion of 
unconditional aid to Pakistan was announced a week later, as a provisional measure before 
Congress voted a $ 1.5 billion aid flow to this country for the next five years. Rep. Lynn 
Woosley, an anti-war Democrat, said: “instead of attempting to find military solutions to the 
problem we face in Iraq and Afghanistan, President Obama must fundamentally change the 
mission in both countries to focus on promoting reconciliation, economic development, 
humanitarian aid, and regional diplomatic efforts” (CNN.com, April 9, 2009). This debate 
illustrates the change of emphasis that occurred since 9/11 and the decisions to invade 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the Bush administration justified the intervention in Iraq by 
claiming that the military option was the key strategy in the war on terror, the Millennium 
Challenge Account was created for channeling aid to poor countries in the wake of George W. 
Bush much cited speech in Monterrey on March 22, 2002, where he said: “We fight against 
poverty because hope is an answer to terror”. This suggests that aid has been part of the 
policy-mix against terrorism at least since that date. 
However, the use of foreign aid as a tool in the war on terror did not get an 
enthusiastic reception from the academic community. Krueger (2007) expressed serious 
doubts about the role of aid for curbing terrorism. The bottom line of his skepticism is that 
poverty does not seem to be the main determinant behind terrorist attacks, while poverty 
alleviation is widely assumed to be the main objective of foreign aid. The data presented in 
 2
Krueger and Maleckova (2003) show that terrorists from different movements, including the 
Hezbollah, are predominantly recruited from a relatively wealthy and educated family 
background, relative to their society of origin. Some other insights on the profiles of terrorists 
can be gleaned from Bloom (2005), Hassan (2001), Reuter (2004), Sageman (2004) and Stern 
(2003), suggesting that terrorists are men and women in their twenties with some post-
secondary training, mostly in technical or engineering education, and coming from a 
relatively well-off family background1. However, while this microeconomic evidence refutes 
a simple view that poverty breeds terrorism, because terrorists are not recruited among the 
poorest segments of their society of origin, the conclusion about the role of foreign aid does 
not necessarily follow from it. The latter rests on the assumption that foreign aid reduces 
poverty or enhances education in recipient countries, a view that is rejected by the “aid-
ineffectiveness” literature, which has accumulated a lot of empirical evidence against it. 
Easterly (2006) offers a synthesis of this literature that tries to sentence foreign aid to death. 
This literature is quite paradoxical, from a methodological point of view. It begs the 
question why rich countries have consistently given away zillions of dollars for nearly six 
decades if this aid flow really was ineffective. Moreover, emerging countries, like China and 
India, are keen to become aid-donors as soon as they reach a certain level of development. 
These observations suggest that the donor-countries’ behavior should not be gauged by 
looking at the poverty impact of foreign aid. Revealed-preference theory suggests a different 
approach, aimed at inferring from donors’ behavior their true objectives. A more satisfactory 
line of empirical research has tried instead to infer the donors’ hidden agenda from the 
econometric analysis of their aid-allocation behavior, starting with papers by Svensson (1999) 
and Alesina and Dollar (2000). The latter literature, which is briefly surveyed by Azam and 
Thelen (2008), brings out that the allocation of foreign aid across developing countries 
                                                 
1 This literature is surveyed in more depth in Azam and Thelen (2008). 
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responds to some political determinants, rather than to the recipient countries’ performances 
in the fight against poverty. This search for foreign aid’s hidden agenda is akin to a detective 
job, and researchers have tested a list of potential objectives, ranging from supporting 
democracy (Svensson, 1999, Alesina and Dollar, 2000) to fighting corruption (Alesina and 
Weder, 2002). This search is likely to have just begun, as many potential objectives easily 
come to mind. There are in fact two different issues in this line of analysis, which the 
literature has not systematically distinguished. Assuming that the donors are rational, the first 
question to ask is whether aid can significantly affect the potential objective under scrutiny. 
The second is to test whether the donors are in fact using this potential trade-off. The latter 
test is a key step in the analysis because it affects the choice of an appropriate econometric 
method for testing the former. Using reduced-form estimation, for example, for performing 
the former test would rest on the untested assumption that the donors are either not aware of 
the existing tradeoff, or else would simply disregard it for devising their policy. Neglecting 
the possible use of the assumed tradeoff by the donor countries would thus lead to spurious 
estimates and preclude drawing any policy recommendations from the results. This two-part 
method is applied by Azam and Thelen (2008) for testing (i) whether foreign aid has a 
significant impact for reducing the number of terrorist attacks originating from recipient 
countries, and (ii) whether the donor community is using this trade-off for curbing 
transnational terrorism. Their findings suggest a positive answer to these two questions. 
The present paper extends the latter analysis and adds foreign military intervention in 
the toolkit used by the North for reducing the number of terrorist attacks from developing 
countries. The likely impact of this variable on terrorist activity has been brought out  by Pape 
(2006), using a series of case studies. He suggests that a lot of terrorist attacks against 
Western interests have been prompted by military interventions by the USA or the NATO 
alliance, and concludes that Middle Eastern terrorism is mainly motivated by nationalism. 
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These terrorists would thus simply be fighting against what they view as a foreign occupation 
of their country. On the other hand, especially since 9/11, recent US military interventions 
have been justified as a key component in the war on terror. Hence, the link between terrorism 
and military intervention could in fact be due to reverse causation, the presence of US and 
allied soldiers being merely a response to a terrorist threat. Gelpi et al. (2009) have shown 
how this cue has been used by the Bush administration for attracting the support of the US 
public opinion in favor of the war in Iraq. However, some dissenting views are claiming that 
the control of oil reserves was the true agenda behind the invasion of Iraq, and not the fight 
against terrorism (see e.g., Cramer and Duggan, 2009). The latter was thus just a cover for 
more materialistic interests that would not attract so much support from the general public. 
Chatterjee (2009) goes one step further in suggesting how some private contractors got a 
privileged access for influencing the decision to invade Iraq, also for oil-related reasons. 
Lastly, we add another interesting variable suggested by Roberts (2003). He points out 
that a common demand by all radical Islamist movements is the introduction of the Shari’a 
Law. Based on his analysis of the Middle East, and of Algeria in particular, he concludes that 
the popular support for this movement is rooted in the feeling by ordinary Muslims that 
Islamism is an effective response to a weak institutional environment marred by corruption 
and injustice. The Shari’a Law would thus be demanded by ordinary people as a way of 
getting an equal rule of Law for all. This implies that terrorist organizations would benefit 
from more popular support if they are perceived by ordinary people as engaged in a fight 
against a government that sustains an unjust legal system, and its external supports. We try to 
capture such an effect in what follows, by looking at the impact of law and order, without 
restricting its domain of application to the Muslim world only. 
The present paper provides an empirical analysis of these issues based on the two-part 
methodology briefly described above. The next section presents a simple extension of the 
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Azam and Thelen (2008) theoretical framework for thinking about the choice made by the 
foreign power between aid and military intervention for reducing terrorism. As in Azam and 
Delacroix (2006), the aid issue is analyzed as a principal-agent problem where the foreign 
power is delegating the fight against terrorism to the recipient government for protecting its 
interests within the latter’s sphere of influence. Military intervention is then added as a tool 
for supporting the recipient government’s effort in the fight against terrorism. Because of the 
debate mentioned above about the true motives of military intervention, this model allows for 
other potential determinants of such interventions. This theoretical analysis is also suggesting 
the kind of instrumental variables that should be used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 
presents the data and briefly describes the econometric method used, while section 4 presents 
the estimation results and the different tests of the hypotheses discussed above. This section 
suggests that US military interventions are probably not mainly motivated by the war on 
terror and are significantly determined by oil-related issues. Moreover, it shows that after 
taking due account of some exogenous heterogeneity across countries, the impact of the US 
military interventions on terrorist attacks is positive on average. A finer analysis is then 
offered for bringing out the conditions under which military intervention is effectively used 
against terrorism. Lastly, after controlling for the impact of these military interventions on the 
supply of terrorist attacks, foreign aid and education remain significant as in the original 
Azam-Thelen model. Some concluding comments are then presented in section 5. 
 
2. The Model 
 
 We model a foreign power that delegates to the governments of some other countries 
the task of protecting its economic and political interests within their respective spheres of 
influence. It has two instruments for doing this, namely giving aid and intervening militarily. 
We do not distinguish between the friendly or hostile interventions that might occur in the real 
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world. In both cases, the ultimate result is the same, i.e., the incumbent local government, or 
the new one in case of a radical intervention, has some enhanced incentives to protect the 
intervener’s interests. The foreign power allocates aid between a number of countries, which 
are liable to produce some terrorist attacks against it, and where the government can exert 
some effort to fight terrorism, at a cost. Then, aid is a way to defray the recipient government 
for this cost of effort. The latter is also affected by the foreign power’s military intervention, 
which is liable to reduce its direct cost of fighting terrorism. The government’s action exerts 
its influence on the value that the activists attach to terrorist attacks against the foreign power 
as well as on their cost. The latter also depends on some idiosyncratic “militancy” parameter. 
Hence, for each country, three players are involved: (i) the terrorist group determines the 
number of attacks against the foreign power, (ii) the local government exerts some effort to 
deter these actions, while (iii) the foreign power provides some aid for compensating the 
government or intervenes militarily for directly reducing the latter’s costs of repression. This 
model is an extension of those in Azam and Delacroix (2006) and Azam and Thelen (2008) 
and some shortcuts are taken in the presentation, when a more detailed derivation can be 
found in these two papers.   
 The Three Agents 
 Denote A the total amount of aid allocated by the foreign power and H the total 
number of terrorist attacks that it gets from the different countries, which inflict a total 
damage worth ( )Hψ , assumed increasing and convex. Denote ia  the aid given to country 
{ }1,...,i n∈ , and ih  the number of attacks originating in i . Then,  iiA a=∑  and iiH h=∑ . 
The donor splits its aid flow between general budget support and an amount is  which is 
earmarked for education. In addition the donor can intervene militarily by an amount im . 
 7
 Country i’s government values the aid flow as well as the level of human capital 
achieved in the country ik , which produces a level of utility ( )iu k  (assumed increasing and 
concave) for the government. The latter captures both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
benefits that the ruler gets from the human capital present in his country. The unit cost of 
producing this human capital is denoted ( ),i isδ ε , which is decreasing in the donor’s 
earmarked contribution is  and in the country’s own past investment in human capital, which 
we call educational capital from now on, denoted iε . The latter captures the social and 
physical infrastructure that the country has in the education (and health) sector, including its 
cultural traditions, its schools and universities, as well as its stock of trained teachers, etc. The 
donor’s earmarked contribution to the education sector is  is reducing the cost of expanding 
human capital borne by the government, because it is not perfectly fungible with either local 
funds or other aid flows. This may capture the use of differentiated inputs like highly 
qualified teachers, without local substitutes, that would not be available without the donor’s 
intervention, or scholarships for joining select institutions abroad. We can thus define the 
government’s profit from human capital investment as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), max ,
ii i k i i i i
s u k s kπ ε δ ε= − .       (1) 
 This function is increasing in its two arguments, reflecting the cost-saving effects of 
the local educational capital and the donor’s earmarked contribution. By Hotelling’s lemma, 
(1) implies that country i ’s human capital level is an increasing function of  is  and iε : 
( ),i i ik k s ε= .          (2) 
 The country’s government also incurs a cost ( ), 0i ir mξ ≥  (assumed increasing and 
convex in ir ) when performing an amount ir  of repression against terrorists, with 
( )0, 0imξ = . This cost is decreasing in the foreign power’s military intervention im , but the 
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latter cannot make it negative. Then, the aid-cum-military support contract will specify how 
much repression the local government is expected to perform against the terrorists in return 
for the aid received, including the earmarked contribution to the education sector, and taking 
due account of the in-kind contribution made by the military intervention. This captures the 
idea that the donor is delegating part of the protection of its interests against terrorism to local 
governments, using aid to defray the costs of doing so incurred by the recipient government. 
For this contract to be acceptable, the quadruplet { }, , ,i i i ia s r m  must fulfill the following 
government’s participation constraint, where we normalize ( )0, 0iπ ε = : 
 ( ) ( ), ,i i i i i ia s s r mπ ε ξ+ − ≥ .        (3) 
 The left-hand side of (3) measures the reward that the recipient government gets from 
the aid-cum-military-support that it gets, while the right-hand side measures the cost that the 
former incurs for protecting the donor’s interests within its own sphere of influence. 
 Let ih  be the number of attacks perpetrated by country i ’s terrorist organization 
against the foreign power’s interests. The terrorist organization attaches a unit value 
( ), ,i i i iv k mθ λ  to these attacks, where iθ  is the “militancy” parameter, assumed known to both 
the donor and the government, and ( ), ,i i iv k m λ  is increasing in its first two arguments. This 
captures the two determinants of the value attached by the terrorists to the attacks against the 
foreign power’s interests mentioned in the introduction, i.e., the positive impact of human 
capital, emphasized by Krueger (2007), and the nationalist response to military intervention 
emphasized by Pape (2006). The country-specific parameter iλ  represents the “legal capital” 
of the country, which might defuse some of the militancy of the potential terrorists. As 
mentioned in the introduction, Roberts (2003) has emphasized the quest for justice that seems 
to underlie the popular adhesion to political Islamism in the Middle East in general and in 
Algeria in particular. Hence, iλ  is meant to capture the existing institutional capital that might 
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mitigate this sense of injustice in country i , and thus has a negative impact on ( ), ,i i iv k m λ . 
The terrorist organization also incurs a cost ( ), , ,i i i ih k r mω  for perpetrating its attacks. This 
function is naturally assumed to be increasing and convex with respect to ih , and increasing in 
ir  and im . The impact of ik  is less clear-cut, and probably combines two opposing effects. 
There is a positive impact, as more educated people have a higher opportunity cost, which the 
terrorist organization will probably take into account. There is another impact going in the 
opposite direction, as more educated people are probably more efficient at performing the 
attacks (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005). However, we do not need to make a firm assumption 
regarding the marginal effects of repression and education on the terrorist organization’s 
costs, as they do not affect the model’s main predictions. The latter only depend on the cross-
second partial derivatives, i.e., the impact of these variables on the marginal cost of 
perpetrating an attack for the terrorist organization. We naturally assume that repression 
increases the marginal cost of an attack, as does the military intervention too. Denoting cross-
second derivatives by subscripts, this means that 0 and 0hr hmω ω> > .  
 The time line of the game is as follows: (i) the donor offers the aid-cum-military 
support contract; (ii) the government exerts the agreed level of repression and chooses its 
preferred education level, both assumed perfectly observable and contractible by the two 
parties; (iii) the terrorists launch their attacks ih ; and lastly (iv) the aid is delivered and 
consumed. Using backward induction, we first derive the terrorist organization’s best-
response function, as a function of the government’s policy variables. Then, the “attacks 
supply curve” is derived at the country level, by bringing in the government’s preferred mix 
of repression and education expenditures, under the foreign power’s influence.  
 The terrorist organization chooses its number of attacks ih  with a view to maximize: 
( ) ( ), , , , ,i i i i i i i i iv k m h h k r mθ λ ω− .       (4) 
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Its best-response function ( ), , , ,i i i i i ih h k r mθ λ=  may be derived from the first-order 
condition ( ) ( ), , , , ,i i i i h i i i iv k m h k r mθ λ ω= , where ( )hω −  is the derivative of the cost with 
respect to the level of attacks. Denoting 0, 0, 0 andhh hr hm hkω ω ω ω> > >  the relevant second 
derivatives of the cost function, the latter implies: 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
, ,
0, 0, 0,
and
i i i hri i i i
i hh i hh i i hh
i i hk i i hmi i
i hh i hh
v k m vh h h
r
v k v mh h
k m
λ ωθ
θ ω λ ω λ ω
θ ω θ ω
ω ω
∂ − − −∂ ∂ ∂= > = < = <∂ − ∂ − ∂ ∂ −
∂ − ∂ − − ∂ − ∂ − −∂ ∂= =∂ − ∂ −
.  (5) 
 The first three partial effects are fairly intuitive: more militant groups produce more 
attacks, while a better legal capital and a greater repression effort by the government reduce 
the number of attacks. The fourth effect is ambiguous, as more human capital increases the 
value of terrorist attacks while its impact on the marginal cost of these attacks is itself 
ambiguous. This is compatible with the ambiguous impact of education on the level of 
terrorist activity predicted by both Bueno de Mesquita (2005) and Azam (2005). Similarly, the 
impact of the foreign power’s military intervention is ambiguous, depending on its relative 
impact on the value of the attacks and on their cost.  
 The Attacks Supply Curve 
Like in Azam and Thelen (2008), we decompose the donor’s problem as follows: 
(i) Aid composition problem: the efficient attacks supply curve is determined for each 
country by minimizing the number of attacks ( ), , , ,i i i i i ih h k r mθ λ= , using is  and ir  as control 
variables, given ia  and im , the government’s participation constraint (3) and its preferred 
education policy (2). The second-order condition requires the terrorists’ best-response 
function to be quasi-convex in si and ri, after substituting for the government’s education 
policy (2), and the government’s participation constraint (3) to be concave in the same space. 
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Then, the first-order conditions can be solved to yield the following government’s expenditure 
functions: 
( ) ( ), , , , and , , , ,i i i i i i i i i i i is s a m r r a mθ λ ε θ λ ε= = .     (6) 
These functions can then be substituted in the terrorists’ best-response function, using 
(2) as well, to get the following structural equation for the efficient attacks supply curves: 
( ), , , ,i i i i i ih h a mθ λ ε= .        (7) 
(ii) Aid-cum-military support allocation problem: the donor’s optimal allocation of aid 
and military support across countries is determined by minimizing the total cost of its 
relations with the recipient countries, including both the cost of the aid-cum-military support 
packages and the cost ( )Hψ  inflicted by the terrorist attacks, taking all the efficient attacks 
supply curves (7) as constraints. Because of the debate regarding the true motivations of 
military interventions mentioned in the introduction, we assume that the latter might be 
motivated by other considerations than just the war on terror. In order to take this into 
account, we define 0iν ≥  as the “geo-strategic” value attached by the foreign power to the 
military intervention over and above its impact on terrorist attacks. Then the foreign power 
seeks to minimize the following sum, subject to all the efficient attacks supply curves (7): 
( ) ( )1 i i
i
A v m Hψ+ − +∑ .        (8) 
The second-order condition requires the efficient attacks supply curves derived at (7) 
to be convex in andi ia m . We also assume that they are not necessarily monotonic in these 
two arguments, i.e., that they are potentially U-shaped. The donor has no reason to leave any 
positive rent to the local government, so that we can immediately infer that (3) will hold with 
equality. Then, minimizing (8) subject to all the attacks supply curves (7) allows us to 
establish proposition 1.  
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Proposition 1: (i) The allocation of the aid-cum-military support across countries will be such 
that the efficient attacks supply curves (7) have the following signs { }1,...,i n∀ ∈ : 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
, ,
0, 0,
110, 0 and .
' ' '
i i ii i i
i hh i hh i
i i i i i
i i i i
v k m vh h
h h h
H s a H m H
λ θ
θ ω λ ω λ
δ ε ν
ε ψ δ ψ ψ
∂ −∂ ∂= > = <∂ − ∂ − ∂
∂ − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ −−= < = < =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
    (9) 
 (ii) The aid-cum military support packages will be governed by the following reduced-
form equations { }1,...,i n∀ ∈ : 
 ( ) ( ), , , , and , , , ,i i i i i i i i i ia a H m m Hθ λ ε ν θ λ ε ν= = .    (10) 
 
Proof: Proposition 1 can be proved by following similar steps to the ones used in 
Azam and Thelen (2008), including its appendix.  
 
 A noticeable property of the attacks supply curves (7), is thus is that the signs of the 
impacts of the educational capital and of aid and military intervention do not depend on the 
terrorists’ parameters, but only on the cost functions entering the donor’s and the 
government’s objective functions. The assumption that the value attached by the terrorists to 
the attacks ( ), ,i i iv k m λ  is increasing in the level of human capital is irrelevant for these 
predictions, suggesting that the observed education level of the terrorists mentioned in the 
introduction is irrelevant for aid policy. Proposition 1 tells us that in any case, more 
educational capital ends up reducing the number of terrorist attacks at the cross-country level, 
because its effect is more than compensated by an adjusted level of repression; for a given aid 
level, a higher level of educational capital allows the local government to reach its human 
capital objective at a lower cost, and thus frees some resources for performing more 
repression.  Hence, for some values of the parameters, the donor might elicit more repression 
from the recipient government by earmarking more funding to education.  
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The new result brought out by proposition 1, relative to Azam and Thelen (2008), is 
the ambiguous impact of the military interventions im , which is not included in that paper. 
Proposition 1 thus predicts that the military intervention will be effective against terrorism in 
country if 1ii ν < , i.e., if the “geo-strategic” value of the intervention is not “too strong”. 
Otherwise, im  is chosen beyond the level that minimizes the number of terrorist attacks, and 
thus has a positive impact on the latter, if 1iν > . Notice also that the chosen level of im  
entails, as shown at (9), that the sign of its impact will be country-specific, as it depends on 
1iν − . The econometric analysis performed below takes this predicted heterogeneity across 
countries into account in a simple fashion that reflect the debate described above. Moreover, 
the two reduced-form equations for andi ia m  given by (10) suggest that this factor of 
heterogeneity iν  should be taken as one of the instrumental variables for estimating the 
structural attacks-supply curve (7) in the empirical analysis below.  
 
3. Data Sources and Econometric Method 
 
 The empirical analysis presented below aims at testing the main predictions of our 
model of the determinants of the number of transnational terrorist events2 per country of 
origin of the perpetrators. 
  Data Sources 
We use two different sources for the dependent variable. The first one is the ARQADE 
dataset, derived from information once available on the International Policy Institute for 
Counter-Terrorism (ICT) website, also used in Azam and Delacroix (2006) and Azam and 
Thelen (2008). Due to some explanatory variables coming from International Country Risk 
Guide (proprietary of the PRS group) described below, the sample used here is restricted to 
                                                 
2Events such that the location, the target, the victims and the perpetrators belong to at least two different 
countries. 
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132 countries. Table A1 shows the number of terrorist events by source country included in 
the present sample. Thus, for example, the West Bank and Gaza Strip are not included in the 
analysis. The number of terrorist events is computed from a set of 1080 terrorist incidents, 
taking place between January 1990 and March 2004 3. In this sample, the terrorist attacks 
originated from 70 source countries4. Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and Krueger and Laitin 
(2003) have used the same source. The other one is constructed from the International 
Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) data set (compiled by Mickolus et al. 
2006). ITERATE also focuses on transnational attacks where terrorism is defined as “the use, 
or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing, extra-normal violence for political purposes by any 
individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established governmental authority, 
when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider 
than the immediate victims”. These data record key information about the date, the country 
location, the incident type and, for many events, the country of origin of the perpetrators. 
Thus, we compute the number of terrorist events according to the perpetrator’s nationality5 
from a set of 2185 events taking place between January 1990 and December 2004. With this 
data and the sample used, the terrorist attacks originated from 95 countries. For each database, 
the transnational terrorist attacks are aggregated over the period 1990 to 2004 to produce the 
total number of attacks originating from each country. 
 We use the standard measure of foreign aid, namely Official Development Assistance 
(ODA). This variable aggregates the disbursements of loans and grants by official agencies of 
the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to promote economic 
development and welfare in the recipient countries. Data are measured in constant 2006 U.S. 
dollars and the source is the online OECD Development Database on CRS Aid Activities. In 
                                                 
3Alexandra Delacroix has produced this data set when she was a master 2 student at Toulouse University. 
4In this database, a terrorist attack perpetrated by more than one terrorist from different countries of origin is 
counted several times, one for each nationality involved. 
5 If more than one nationality is involved then the event is attributed to the country where most of the members 
in the group have their citizenship. So each event is counted only once.  
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the sample used in this article, 24 countries are aid donors, mainly OECD member countries. 
To measure the educational capital, we use the gross enrollment rate in secondary education, 
i.e., the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that 
officially corresponds to the level of secondary education. This is admittedly a fairly gross 
proxy, which we instrument below for the sake of controlling for measurement error. To 
control for the level of economic development, and thus to mitigate the risk of finding a 
spurious correlation with aid and the level of education due in fact to under development, we 
add GDP per capita in constant 2000 U.S. dollars. The source of the data for the gross 
enrollment rate in secondary education and GDP per capita is the World Bank’s online World 
Development Indicators (WDI). 
To test the impact of the military approach to deter terrorism, we focus on US overseas 
military interventions, using the number of US soldiers deployed in the host country. As 
emphasized by Pape (2006), for example, in his analysis of the presence of American forces 
in Iraq and in the Arabian Peninsula, all the campaigns of terrorist organizations have the 
common goal of getting foreign military forces out of the terrorists’ country of origin. The 
strategy and the targets attacked by Al-Qaeda suggest that their principal motive is to end 
foreign military occupation of the Arabian Peninsula and other Muslim regions. Between 
1980 and 1990, the US military forces on the Arabian Peninsula were less than 800 soldiers as 
opposed to on average 10,000 soldiers between 1990 and 2001. A strong presence of foreign 
troops may thus cause an increase in “militancy” in the country which affects the number of 
terrorist incidents, especially the presence of US troops in Middle East as mentioned by Pape 
(2006). Thus, our proxy for foreign military intervention is the average number of US military 
personnel6 over the period covered. As mentioned in section 2, we do not consider the 
“direction of the intervention”, i.e., whether the intervention is supporting the incumbent 
                                                 
6The source of the active duty military personnel strengths by country is the Directorate for Information 
Operations and Reports (U.S. Department of Defense). Considering the number of US soldier in US equal to 
zero as they have other organizations to fight terrorism in the country. 
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government or helping to replace it with a more favorable one. Like for the amount of aid and 
educational capital, a military intervention is liable to be endogenous, as a response to the 
presence of highly militant groups in the country. Another useful variable for capturing some 
aspects of “militancy” is an “ethnic tension” index. Basuchoudhary and Shughart (2007) show 
that this variable affects significantly the level of terrorist attacks by country of origin.  We 
use the same IRIS-3 data set (International Country Risk Guide, proprietary of the PRS group) 
where ethnic tension is an assessment of the degree of tension within a country attributable to 
racial, nationality or language divisions. The methodology is not published, but they argue 
that this index is a better measure of ethnic polarization than ethnic fractionalization since it is 
more sensitive to the definition of the different groups. It assigns numbers ranging from 0 to 6 
to each country, higher values originally indicating lower ethnic tension. In order to have an 
increasing order and to facilitate the interpretation of the results, we use the same index but 
ranging from -6 to 0 with higher values (close to 0) indicating higher ethnic tension. 
We also use dummy variables for capturing this “militancy” aspect: “Camp David” 
(Egypt and Israel), China and India, Latin American countries, Sub-Saharan countries, former 
USSR countries, ASEAN countries before 1990 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand) and OECD countries before 1990. Azam and Delacroix (2006) and Azam and 
Thelen (2008) have shown that these dummy variables contain some relevant information for 
identifying the equations. They may also control for other country characteristics such as 
geography and civilization.  
Finally, to capture the impact of the level of legal capital in each country, for 
describing the sense of “justice” suggested by Roberts (2003) as an important determinant of 
popular support for political Islamism and other radical positions, we use the “Law and 
Order” component of the IRIS-3 data set. Many empirical studies aiming at clarifying the link 
between democracy and terrorist incidents use variables capturing civil liberties or political 
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rights, with the possible endogeneity bias that this may entail. In our theoretical framework 
modeled above, variables of this kind are optimized out in defining the structural equation, as 
they are closely related to “repression”. On the other hand, the strength of the legal system 
may be regarded as exogenous because of the longer time needed to change these institutions 
compared to the level of repression imposed by the government. This indicator is made from 
two components, which are assessed separately. The “Law” one represents the strength and 
the impartiality of the legal system while the “Order” one is an assessment of popular 
observance of the law. This index also assigns numbers ranging from 0 to 6 with higher 
values indicating sound legal institutions and a strong court system. 
Table A2 in the appendix provides some summary statistics for these data. A majority 
of countries have an ODA per capita between 0 and 50 dollars and countries receiving more 
than 100 dollars are the poorest ones. The majority of countries have a gross secondary school 
enrollment rate between 90 and 100% but many others have a much lower rate, especially 
among developing countries. The average value of ethnic tension is -4.06 and the higher 
values (close to 0) indicating a higher ethnic tension are not only assigned to developing 
countries; for example Israel has a value of -1.56. Finally, the average value of Law and Order 
is 3.83. The countries with a value of 6 are only democratic countries, while autocratic 
countries7 do not always stand for the lowest values. For example Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia 
and Vietnam have above average values for ethnic tension and law and order. 
 Econometric Method 
 The dependent variable is the number of terrorist events per source country, which 
only has non-negative integer values, while many countries are the source of no attacks at all. 
Hence, the attacks supply curve cannot be analyzed by standard least squares estimation and 
we present only the results of the negative binomial specification. 
                                                 
7Using the definition of the Freedom House indexes on political rights and civil liberties. 
 18
 One of our key predictions is that the amounts of foreign aid and educational capital 
affect negatively the number of attacks originating from the recipient countries. However, the 
aid may be allocated with a view to control the terrorist attacks originating from the recipient 
country by defraying the recipient government costs of such an effort, or to entice the latter to 
fight terrorism within its sphere of influence by some in-kind contributions reducing the cost 
of some other public investments. Therefore, we only present the results controlling for 
endogeneity, as the theoretical model predicts that the number of attacks per source country, 
the amount of aid received, and the level of the foreign military intervention are 
simultaneously determined. To account for this, we use a version of the Hausman test 
(Wooldridge 1997). This procedure has two stages: first, a reduced-form equation is estimated 
for each endogenous variable using exogenous regressors. Then, the resulting residuals are 
computed and included in the initial model. If the residuals are jointly significant according to 
a Wald test, the endogeneity assumption is not rejected. The additional benefit of this 
approach is that it removes the endogeneity bias that would otherwise affect the estimates. 
We also test the ambiguous impact of a military solution to deter terrorist attacks. The 
war on terror may only be one of a number of competing foreign policy goals, and in this 
analysis we bring out the role of oil as an alternative goal, as explained in the introduction. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
 From our theoretical model, we expect negative and significant impacts of the amount 
of aid received and the level of education on the number of terrorist attacks per source 
country. We also expect that a military intervention in a country with low geo-strategic value 
may be effective to deter terrorism, with the opposite prediction for a country where the 
intervention is more driven by geo-strategic interests than by the war on terror. First, we 
present the reduced-form equations of the endogenous variables and then the structural model 
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corrected for the endogeneity bias.  
Reduced-Form Equations 
For each endogenous variable we use all the exogenous variables of the structural 
model and various instruments as regressors. Table 1 shows that all our reduced-form 
equations are significant and provide an acceptable starting point for the subsequent analysis. 
Some economic variables such as per capita GDP and population size explain to some 
extent the need for aid. As instrument for the educational capital we use the under-5 mortality 
rate8. This is a slow-moving variable which may be regarded as pre-determined, and is clearly 
related to past investments in favor of human capital, especially for women. For capturing 
geo-strategic considerations, we use the shortest distance to an oil-exporting country. We only 
consider countries where oil exports amount on average to more than 30% of merchandise 
export (source WDI online) during the period 1990-2004. Then, for each country we 
computed the distance between its capital-city and the capital-city of the nearest oil-producing 
country. The latter countries have thus a distance to oil wells equal to zero.  
In our sample, 24 countries are aid donors and only developing countries receive aid. 
Hence, these variables are truncated at zero and lead us to use the standard Tobit regression. 
In Table 1, equation [1] is the reduced-form equation for per capita ODA with only 
exogenous explanatory variables. The resulting model is globally significant. Beside the 
variables listed above, we include a series of dummy variables to control for other country 
characteristics like civilization (e.g., Sub-Saharan African countries). We also tried to add 
dummy variables capturing the colonial past of each country but most of the time they turned 
out to be insignificant.  
 
                                                 
8 Source of Data: WDI online. 
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Table 1:  Reduced-Form Equations 
 
Variables ODA per capita Secondary School 
Number of US 
troops (log) 
  [1] [2] [3] 
Intercept 415.8640*** 90.8945*** -0.5440 
 (44.9824) (20.7915) (3.4163) 
GDP p.c. -0.0046*** 0.0002 0.0000 
 (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0001) 
Population (log) -21.2183*** -0.8158 0.3690** 
 (2.3828) (1.0455) (0.1854) 
0.0272 -0.2530*** -0.0091** Under 5 Mortality Rate  
(per 1000) (0.0521) (0.0473) (0.0041) 
Distance to Oil Wells 0.0017 0.0005 -0.0001* 
 (0.0022) (0.0012) (0.0001) 
ASEAN 3.5632 -7.6589 0.5939 
 (8.7300) (5.7200) (0.9444) 
“Camp David” 137.7570** 11.8916* 1.5399 
 (65.6344) (6.0904) (1.0725) 
China and India 36.6723*** -7.0305 -1.0818 
 (12.7517) (6.2090) (1.0605) 
Latin America -0.5364 -3.7451 -0.0709 
 (12.9289) (5.0844) (0.6603) 
OECD -45.0048** 22.3952*** 1.8437 
 (19.2546) (6.0958) (1.1592) 
USSR -23.1255*** 15.3398*** -1.9472*** 
 (8.5321) (3.7784) (0.5193) 
Sub-Saharan -12.9368* -11.6100 -0.8193 
 (7.4574) (7.5759) (0.7447) 
Ethnic Tension 7.0829 0.5277 -0.0635 
 (4.4003) (1.3857) (0.1736) 
Law and Order 2.5345 1.7205* -0.4273 
 (4.1492) (0.9578) (0.2591) 
Observations 132 132 132 
LR statistic 150.00*** 53.07*** 12.87*** 
Pseudo- or Adjusted R2 0.679 0.786 0.367 
 
Note: Equation [1] is a Tobit regression while [2] and [3] are least squares regressions 
estimated by maximum likelihood. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10 %, ** significant at 5 %, *** significant at 1 %. 
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The Structural Attacks-Supply Equation 
Table 2 presents the results using the ARQADE dataset with ODA per capita. In each 
equation, we add the corresponding residuals from the reduced-form equations presented 
above and the relevant F-test for their joint significance, for the sake of controlling for 
endogeneity. In all these equations, the amount of ODA per capita and the level of secondary 
education have the expected significant negative impact on the number of terrorist events 
originating from each country. Equation [4] does not take into account the military 
intervention, and its results can be directly compared with those obtained in Azam and Thelen 
(2008). Taking into account more control variables like the level of ethnic tension and law 
and order do not significantly change their conclusions. The level of foreign aid and the level 
of secondary education have a significant and negative impact, while the significant residuals 
vindicate the endogeneity assumption.  
Regarding the impact of military intervention, the results are somehow ambiguous and 
depend on whether we take into account the geo-strategic interest captured by the distance to 
oil wells or not. In equation [5], the number of US troops deployed in the country affects 
positively the number of terrorist events by country of origin of the perpetrators. This 
provides some support for the Pape (2006) hypothesis described above. However, this does 
not take into account the heterogeneity regarding the motivations for intervention introduced 
in our theoretical framework. In order to capture such an effect, we add in equations [6] and 
[7] an interaction term between the number of US troops and the distance to oil wells 
described above. This excludes the oil-exporting countries from the interaction term, and 
gives more weight to countries, the further away they are from oil-producing regions. The 
results support the hypothesis that a military intervention motivated by the war on terror and 
not by geo-strategic interests is effective, as the interaction term has a significant negative 
sign. A deployment of US troops reduces the number of terrorist attacks coming from the host 
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country, if the latter is located far from oil wells, in our sample. Moreover, equation [6] shows 
that the positive term looses its statistical significance, suggesting that oil-exporting countries 
are influential outliers in our sample. On average in our sample, oil-exporting countries, 
which account for about 20 % of the sample, host 20 % more US soldiers than the others and 
produce more than twice as many terrorist attacks. Hence, removing this variable, and leaving 
only the interaction term yields an acceptable equation allowing us to conclude that military 
interventions are effective against terrorism except when they take place in an oil-producing 
country. In the latter case, they might be counter-productive as far as the war on terror is 
concerned, but this impact is not estimated with any precision.  
Taken individually, the residuals of the ODA per capita and secondary school 
enrollment reduced-form equations are always significant, while those for military 
intervention are not always significant. This result strengthens the hypothesis that a military 
deployment of troops may not always be motivated by the threat of terrorism in the country, 
but by some other interest instead. However, they are significant in equation [7] where 
military interventions in oil-exporting countries are de facto excluded. Moreover, we find that 
the more relevant joint test for endogeneity in each equation confirms the presence of some 
potential bias, as predicted by our theoretical framework.  
Regarding the other control variables, per capita GDP is never significant, as in 
Krueger and Maleckova (2003). Nevertheless, it is useful to disentangle the effect of foreign 
aid from that of under-development. Three of the geographical dummy variables are 
significant most of the time. “Camp David”, indicating Egypt and Israel, and the dummy for 
OECD member countries have a positive and significant impact on the number of terrorist 
events per source country. In our sample, six OECD countries have produced at least six 
terrorist attacks (Spain (31), Turkey (28), Greece (11), France (7), Ireland (6) and Italy (6)). 
Finally, the dummy for Sub Saharan countries has a negative and significant coefficient. The 
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“ethnic tension” and “law and order” variables are significant with a positive and negative 
impacts, respectively, vindicating Basuchoudhary and Shughart (2007) and Roberts (2003).  
 
Table 2: Number of Terrorist Events Originating from Each Country 
 
Variables  [4] [5] [6] [7] 
Intercept 9.0961*** 8.8848*** 3.2002 3.1459 
 (3.2702) (3.2235) (3.8384) (3.8025) 
GDP p.c. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Population (log) 0.1063 0.0971 0.3670** 0.3764** 
 (0.1383) (0.1482) (0.1807) (0.1640) 
ODA p.c. -0.0406*** -0.0395*** -0.0249** -0.0250** 
 (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0115) (0.0116) 
-0.0564*** -0.0575*** -0.0462*** -0.0457*** Secondary Enrollment 
(% gross) (0.0130) (0.0143) (0.0148) (0.0136) 
OECD 1.6794** 1.6239** 1.7342** 1.7720*** 
 (0.6626) (0.7468) (0.7200) (0.6423) 
“Camp David” 7.1912*** 6.8896*** 4.9892*** 5.0388*** 
 (1.2955) (1.2970) (1.4523) (1.4041) 
Sub-Saharan -3.6157*** -3.5009*** -3.0009*** -3.0263*** 
 (0.6680) (0.6927) (0.7191) (0.7003) 
Ethnic Tension 0.5773*** 0.5824*** 0.4388*** 0.4351*** 
 (0.1277) (0.1294) (0.1448) (0.1384) 
Law and Order -0.4624*** -0.4375** -0.5539*** -0.5703*** 
 (0.1790) (0.2060) (0.2116) (0.1778) 
- 0.0906** 0.0268 - Number of US Troops in 
the Country (log)  (0.0451) (0.2453)  
- - -0.0001** -0.0001** Interaction Nb. US 
troops x dist. to oil   (0.0000) (0.0000) 
0.0528*** 0.0515*** 0.0355*** 0.0356*** Endog. Bias ODA p.c. (0.0122) (0.0114) (0.0121) (0.0122) 
0.0685*** 0.0695*** 0.0590*** 0.0584*** Endog. Bias Secondary (0.0170) (0.0182) (0.0185) (0.0174) 
- -0.0150 0.1178 0.1449** Endog. Bias Military 
Variable  (0.2442) (0.2524) (0.0635) 
Observations 132 132 132 132 
Log pseudolikelihood -280.81 -280.09 -277.84 -277.84 
Wald statistic 154.789*** 203.586*** 374.592*** 356.266*** 
Endogeneity Joint Test 26.58*** 28.04*** 16.09*** 20.63*** 
 
Note:  These equations are negative binomial regressions estimated by maximum likelihood.  
           Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
        * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Robustness Checks 
Finally, following Shughart (2006), we also tested the hypothesis that terrorism may 
be a response to the artificial states created after the collapse of the Ottoman and Colonial 
Empires. We tested this prediction by including dummy variables for the former colonies of 
France, United Kingdom, Spain and Portugal, and one dummy variable for countries created 
after the Ottoman Empire was dismantled. The latter countries do not produce more or less 
transnational terrorist attacks than the others. Probably, a more suitable study for testing this 
hypothesis might be one of intra-national terrorist attacks perpetrated by some citizens of the 
target country. The dummy variables controlling for former colonies also failed to be 
significant most of the time. Therefore, all these variables are excluded from the final 
regressions. 
We have also reproduced all the results presented in table 2 using ODA as a ratio to 
GDP, instead of to population, without changing any conclusions9. The results using the 
ITERATE dataset are also presented in the appendix (table A3), and they yield mainly the 
same conclusions regarding the impact of aid, education and military intervention, and they 
confirm the presence of an endogeneity bias. One difference is that the ethnic tension variable 
is less often significant with the ITERATE dataset than with the ARQADE one. This is 
probably due to the different conventions used by the two datasets for selecting the nationality 
of the perpetrators. Moreover, ITERATE uses “Kurdistan” as a potential nationality of 
terrorists, what probably reduces the estimated impact of ethnic tensions for the countries with 
a Kurdish minority.  
In order to check how robust are our results relative to foreign military intervention, 
we also tried to capture these military interventions using two different variables for the 
numbers of US soldiers, depending on whether the host country was oil-exporting or not. The 
                                                 
9 The appendix containing the corresponding tables for this exercise is available from the authors upon request. 
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results are shown in table A4, where the same pattern identified above emerges. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 The empirical results presented in this paper provide some support to the theoretical 
framework presented above. The latter models the aid-cum-military intervention of the 
foreign power as a way of delegating the fight against terrorism to the recipient governments 
within their sphere of influence. As in Azam and Thelen (2008), we find that foreign aid is 
effective for reducing terrorism, and is actually used by donors to this end. Similarly, we find 
that the donor community can usefully earmark some foreign aid for the education sector, 
despite the much advertized survey results demonstrating that terrorists generally have a 
relatively wealthy and educated family background. The reason for this seemingly 
paradoxical result is that what matters for aid policy is not its impact on potential terrorists, 
but its effects on the recipient governments. Earmarking some aid in favor of the education 
sector could be an effective way of eliciting stronger counter-terrorist measures from the 
recipient government.  
 We have added military intervention to the toolkit available to the foreign power for 
reducing the number of terrorist attacks that affect it. The difficult point in this respect is to 
separate different types of military interventions according to their main motivations. It would 
be unfair to label military interventions as ineffective, or even counter-productive, if their true 
aim was not to fight terrorism. In the theoretical model, we have introduced a “geo-strategic” 
value of the intervention, for capturing these other potential motivations, beyond the war on 
terror. In the empirical approach, the key variable that we found for sorting out the military 
interventions by their different motivations is the distance of the country where the 
intervention takes place from the closest oil-exporting country. If we neglect to take this 
source of heterogeneity across countries into account, then we find that military interventions 
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have a counter-productive impact, by increasing the number of terrorist attacks originating 
from the countries where the US military intervention takes place. However, when due 
account is taken of the distance from oil of the country hosting the US military intervention, 
we find that the latter are effective against terrorism. Hence, our econometric findings provide 
some support to the view that US military interventions are effective against terrorism, except 
when they take place in oil-exporting countries. Moreover, with this caveat, we find that US 
military interventions are actually motivated by the war on terror in these cases. 
 Because our theoretical framework is analyzing the policy choices made by the foreign 
power endogenously, it does not provide a lot of direct policy recommendations. 
Nevertheless, some lessons might be drawn cautiously from our results, shedding some light 
on how foreign aid and military interventions might be used to fight terrorism more 
effectively. Our findings confirm some results found by others before, like the irrelevance of 
GDP per capita, emphasized by Krueger (2007). Enhancing economic growth should not be a 
priority insofar as aid policy is targeted at protecting the political and economic interests of 
donor countries. In a longer run perspective, our results suggest that two very slow-moving 
variables like ethnic tension and law and order could be seen as potential proximate targets for 
exerting some influence on the recipient countries’ level of militancy. This is more easily said 
than done, as these variables are nested in the core of the cultural setting of these countries. 
Nevertheless, these results suggests that foreign powers should avoid by all means to take any 
action that might pit one ethnic group against another one, as was done sometimes in colonial 
times, and also in recent times in some cases. Similarly, donors should emphasize law and 
order in their interventions, while acknowledging that no magic bullet exists in this domain.  
 Lastly, the choice made by foreign powers between giving aid and intervening 
militarily is modeled here as endogenous. We have introduced a “geo-strategic” value that 
could be seen as reflecting some socio-political processes going on in the donor countries. 
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The basic point in this respect is that oil-exporting countries seem to attract some military 
interventions that might entail some negative externalities on the donor countries’ public, by 
increasing the risk of terrorist attacks. Although this impact is not statistically significant in 
our results when due account is taken of the relevant heterogeneity across countries, it is too 
strong in simpler equations to be neglected altogether. On the other hand, the rich consumers 
of the donor countries would also feel a negative externality if the oil market was deeply 
disturbed, and a political choice has to be made between these two evils. Nevertheless, some 
recent work by Gelpi et al. (2009) suggests that the US public opinion is far from being 
passive regarding military interventions abroad, and is basing its position on a relatively 
sophisticated cost-benefit analysis. However, what it seems to be lacking is enough 
independent information on the precise tradeoffs involved, what makes it prey to the 
potentially biased information campaigns by the government. For example, our results 
provide no support to the view that the US invasion of Iraq was motivated by the war on 
terror, nor likely to have any favorable effect on terrorist activity. Hence the main fallout of 
the type of analysis performed in this paper might be to draw attention on the finding that 
military interventions motivated by oil exports might increase the risk of a terrorist attack 
against the West. Taking this effect into account would probably lead the relevant public 
opinions to nuance the relative valuation that they attach to aid and military interventions.  
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Appendix  
 
Table A1:  Number of Events per Source Country (1990:01-2004:03) 
Country Number Country Number Country Number
India 227 Ethiopia 7 Latvia 2 
Colombia 97 France 7 Liberia 2 
Israel 58 Venezuela 7 Malaysia 2 
Iraq 49 Ireland 6 Netherland 2 
Yemen 49 Italy 6 Panama 2 
Algeria 47 Jordan 6 Switzerland 2 
Pakistan 45 Bangladesh 5 Armenia 1 
Angola 41 Ecuador 5 Croatia 1 
Russian F. 33 Iran 5 Czech Rep. 1 
Spain 31 Japan 5 Emirates 1 
Turkey 28 Lebanon 4 Guinea 1 
Nigeria 26 Sudan 4 Honduras 1 
Sri Lanka 25 U.S. 4 Libya 1 
Peru 22 Austria 3 Morocco 1 
Sierra Leone 21 Argentina 2 Nicaragua 1 
Egypt 19 Azerbaijan 2 Norway 1 
Philippines 19 Bolivia 2 Poland 1 
Greece 11 Chile 2 Senegal 1 
Indonesia 11 China 2 Sweden 1 
Uganda 10 El Salvador 2 Tanzania 1 
Saudi Arabia 9 Germany 2 Thailand 1 
U.K. 9 Kenya 2 Tunisia 1 
South Africa 8 Kuwait 2 Zambia 1 
Bahrain 7     
Source: ICT (http://www.ict.org.il). The complete data set is available in Azam and  
Thelen (2008). 
 
Tableau A2: Summary Statistics 
  Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Number of events (ICT) 132 7.75 1 23.76 0 227 
Number of events (ITERATE) 132 16.55 3 37.00 0 253 
Logarithm of population 132 16.18 16.14 1.56 12.51 20.92 
GDP per capita 132 6476.57 1930.97 9134.75 96.86 38952.22
ODA per capita 132 35.78 21.70 43.05 0 239.21 
ODA (% of GDP) 132 5.91 1.21 10.17 0 63.99 
Secondary school enrol. (% gross) 132 69.88 75.89 32.88 5.5 151.33
Ethnic Tension 132 -4.06 -4.26 1.24 -0.31 -6 
Law and Order 132 3.83 3.87 1.28 0.98 6 
Number of US troops in the 132 3.54 2.92 2.53 0 11.47 
Distance to Oil reserve 132 1353.17 1084.5 1326.18 0 7725 
Under-5 Infant Mortality Rate (per 132 63.42 33.38 69.37 4.52 290.95 
Source: Computed from Table A1, ITERATE, World Development Indicators and PRS group. 
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Table A3: Number of Terrorist Events Originating from Each Country 
(Controlling for Endogeneity with ITERATE Data and ODA per Capita) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 9.9231** 10.5551*** 8.5499* 7.3464 
 (4.5952) (4.0920) (4.6176) (5.0565) 
GDP p.c. -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Population (log) -0.0230 -0.2157 -0.1248 0.0872 
 (0.2088) (0.1782) (0.2078) (0.2315) 
ODA p.c. -0.0340*** -0.0317*** -0.0273** -0.0285** 
 (0.0126) (0.0116) (0.0125) (0.0130) 
-0.0453*** -0.0558*** -0.0522*** -0.0401*** Secondary Enrollment 
(% gross) (0.0122) (0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0126) 
OECD 2.8911*** 2.1986** 2.1539** 2.8258*** 
 (0.8317) (0.8820) (0.8635) (0.7878) 
“Camp David” 5.4773*** 4.1175** 3.4099** 4.4962** 
 (1.7845) (1.6697) (1.7361) (1.7981) 
Sub-Saharan -3.0711*** -2.4398*** -2.2826*** -2.8245*** 
 (0.6073) (0.6217) (0.6288) (0.6254) 
Ethnic Tension 0.1562 0.2212* 0.1489 0.0708 
 (0.1345) (0.1245) (0.1351) (0.1445) 
Law and Order -0.5169*** -0.1458 -0.1730 -0.5375*** 
 (0.1561) (0.1915) (0.1990) (0.1608) 
- 0.6233*** 0.6063*** - Number of US Troops 
in the Country (log)  (0.1821) (0.1773)  
- - -0.0000 -0.0001** Interaction Nb. US 
troops x dist. to oil   (0.0000) (0.0000) 
0.0399*** 0.0364*** 0.0312** 0.0333** Endog. Bias ODA p.c. (0.0138) (0.0128) (0.0133) (0.0138) 
0.0501*** 0.0651*** 0.0635*** 0.0482*** Endog. Bias 
Secondary (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0149) (0.0150) 
- -0.6099*** -0.5699*** 0.0344 Endog. Bias Military 
Variable  (0.1859) (0.1855) (0.0605) 
Observations 132 132 132 132 
Log pseudolikelihood -414.20 -411.33 -410.89 -413.50 
Wald statistic 98.303*** 115.957*** 127.007*** 108.738*** 
Endogeneity Joint Test 15.9*** 30.38*** 26.47*** 17.28*** 
Note: These equations are negative binomial regressions estimated by maximum likelihood.  
           Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
          * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A4: Number of Terrorist Events Originating from Each Country  
(Controlling for Endogeneity with ARQADE Data and ODA per capita) 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 3.7663 3.7683 3.8970 
 (3.2633) (3.2618) (3.1614) 
GDP p.c. -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Population (log) 0.3014** 0.3010** 0.3585*** 
 (0.1348) (0.1456) (0.1352) 
ODA p.c. -0.0240** -0.0240** -0.0265*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0101) 
-0.0494*** -0.0494*** -0.0453*** Secondary Enrollment  
(% gross) (0.0131) (0.0143) (0.0129) 
OECD 2.6766*** 2.6749*** 2.9441*** 
 (0.6774) (0.7390) (0.6962) 
“Camp David” 5.1638*** 5.1617*** 5.7945*** 
 (1.2989) (1.3988) (1.2418) 
Sub-Saharan -2.9200*** -2.9190*** -3.2027*** 
 (0.6642) (0.6965) (0.6515) 
Ethnic Tension 0.4940*** 0.4941*** 0.4741*** 
 (0.1379) (0.1405) (0.1355) 
Law and Order -0.3873** -0.3867** -0.5309*** 
 (0.1704) (0.1910) (0.1662) 
0.2496*** 0.2506 - Nb. of US troops in oil-
exporting country (log) (0.0725) (0.2585)  
- 0.0011 -0.2320*** Nb. of US troops in non-oil-
exporting country (log)  (0.2471) (0.0687) 
0.0371*** 0.0371*** 0.0400*** Endog. Bias ODA p.c. (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0113) 
0.0643*** 0.0643*** 0.0600*** Endog. Bias Secondary (0.0171) (0.0180) (0.0164) 
-0.0289 -0.0300 0.2100*** Endog. Bias Military Variable (0.0609) (0.2527) (0.0664) 
Observations 132 132 132 
Log pseudolikelihood -276.32 -276.32 -276.72 
Wald statistic 159.510*** 170.984*** 175.494*** 
Endogeneity Joint Test 18.90*** 18.68*** 31.40*** 
Note: These equations are negative binomial regressions estimated by maximum 
likelihood.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
          * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
